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R.W. Emerson et le 11 septembre 2001
La brisure
Maurice Gonnaud
1 Peut‑être sous l’effet d’une longue cohabitation avec la pensée d’Emerson, il m’a semblé
que la rupture créée par les attaques mortifères du 11 septembre dernier au sein de la
conscience  américaine  relevaient  de  la  même  intrusion  d’une  réalité  jusqu’alors
impensable que le traumatisme provoqué chez le « sage de Concord » par l’adoption en
1850 d’une loi sur les esclaves fugitifs, qui piégeait chaque citoyen, au Nord comme au
Sud, en faisant de lui le complice,  voire l’exécutant,  d’une insupportable violation du
droit de chacun à vivre librement. Comme George W. Bush, et avec lui beaucoup de ses
concitoyens, s’étaient installés avant le 11 septembre dans une problématique qui prenait
instinctivement appui sur l’exceptionalisme américain, ainsi Emerson, avant 1850, s’était
persuadé qu’en toutes circonstances la force d’âme individuelle (« the infinitude of the
private man », comme le dit beaucoup plus éloquemment son anglais) suffisait à conjurer
les menaces et les périls extérieurs. Il n’est que de lire son essai sur le Tragique (1844)
pour apprécier la fondamentale sérénité de son regard. Rien ne le préparait à l’expérience
crucifiante de 1850.
2 D’une certaine manière, la prise en compte de cette révélation tardive, mais dévastatrice,
avait orienté l’ensemble de la réflexion que j’avais conduite sur les engagements et les
désengagements d’Emerson tout au long de sa carrière, et elle m’avait permis de remettre
en cause l’optimisme massif dont il était de bon ton de le créditer. Intuitions obstinément
heureuses, certes, mais en contrepoint conscience sinon malheureuse du moins inquiète,
travaillée par un incessant besoin de questionnement. Or cette lecture, à la croisée de la
philosophie et de l’histoire, de l’œuvre publique et du Journal, n’avait guère convaincu
nos homologues américains. Lorsque néanmoins la traduction de mon livre [Individu et
société dans l’œuvre de R.W. Emerson, Essai de biographie spirituelle, Paris, Didier, 1964] fut
envisagée, je proposai à l’éditeur d’en rédiger la préface, avec pour arrière‑pensée de
rendre palpables les lignes de force qui soutenaient mon argument. Une version anglaise
fut effectivement publiée [An Uneasy Solitude,  Individual  and Society in  the  Work of  R.W.
Emerson, translated by Lawrence Rosenwald, Princeton N.J., Princeton U.P., 1987], mais,
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faute de se trouver en résonance avec l’orthodoxie du moment, le texte liminaire que
j’avais soumis ne fut pas retenu. Il est donc resté inédit jusqu’à ce jour, et il m’a semblé
intéressant d’en proposer la publication, au moins partielle, dans un contexte historique
entièrement  renouvelé,  susceptible  du  coup  de  resituer  mon  commentaire  et  de  lui
redonner une certaine pertinence :
3 [On se reportera aussi au numéro « Emerson » de la Revue française d'études américaines]
4 […] Very soon I was made crucially aware of the absorptive faculties of Emerson’s mind
when stirred by external stimuli. While the transcendentalist vision of life focussed on its
simplicities, a mere record of Emerson’s unfailingly sensitive responses to circumstances,
whether social or economic, parochial or broadly national, left one with a sense of his
immense ability to adjust to the changing panorama of the United States. But adjustment,
for Emerson, was not tantamount to renunciation. For an observer standing at the far end
of his intellectual trajectory, fidelity and adaptability appear almost miraculously fused in
a stance illustrating, and at the same time concealing, the conflicting demands of the self
and  society.  His  introduction  of  the  concept  of  race,  with  racial  inequality  as  its
squarely‑faced corollary, into the fabric of his thought might serve as an example of this
mental resilience, though it also demonstrates his propensity to adorn the ugliness of
facts and to smooth out the tragedies inherent in individual experience.
5 Gradually, however, I came to recognize the heavy personal price that Emerson had been
made to pay at every stage of his successful strategy. I became convinced that the debate
between his private self and the public figure with which he had had, willy nilly, to accept
identification—first  as  Unitarian  minister,  then  as  acknowledged  leader  of  the
transcendentalist  group,  later still  as America’s  foremost thinker—had been far more
dramatic, and had reached down to a much greater depth, than was usually realized. I
could not help visualizing Emerson as a sort of austere, morality‑ridden Victor Hugo (if
this  is  conceivable  at  all),  cut  out  for  producing  New  England  versions  of  Les
Contemplations, and stubbornly deflected from his appointed course by religious or secular
calls, which eventually turned him into a fighter and compelled him to write, through his
two « Fugitive Slave Law Addresses » and other such discourses, his own minor brand of
Les Châtiments.
6 How these recurring urges to public commitment affected the tenor and balance of his
work,  how they were  responsible  for  a  pattern of  moral  compulsion,  self‑doubt  and
partial withdrawal resulting in a reaffirmation of his vocation as a poet, is one of the
points to which this book addresses itself with deliberate emphasis. Beyond the tensions
which developed between the private man and the public figure, it purports to document
the dialogue,  both subtle and taut,  through which private self  sought to establish an
acceptable compromise. Examined from this standpoint, the Journal appears to be much
more than the quarry from which Emerson extracted blocks for the construction of his
lectures or the illustration of his books. It is, quite fascinatingly, the hidden face of his
public writings, the portion of truth that he was withholding from his contemporaries for
reasons that never ceased to put him on the rack. When in 1838 he brought himself to
write a letter to President Van Buren to protest the removal of the Cherokee Indians from
their Georgia territory, the Journal registered his reluctance to enter the political arena
in terms verging on loathsomeness. Fifteen years later, in the midst of the slavery crisis
which wrenched him from his principled aloofness, he turned to his journal for inner
reassurance and, over and over again, reaffirmed in its pages his faith in the primacy of
solitude.  A fuller  awareness of  this  semi‑clandestine dialogue will  drive home to the
R.W. Emerson et le 11 septembre 2001
Transatlantica, 1 | 2001
2
reader I believe, the intensities and reverberations of the debate which was set going in
the United States when, to paraphrase Tocqueville, the emergence of individualism as an
almost national philosophy vindicated the right for every individual to isolate himself
from the community—an attitude ultimately leading to a traumatic redefinition of the
dynamics  of  society.  In  this  larger  context,  even  the  idiosyncrasies  characteristic  of
Emerson’s temper were taking on genuine representativeness.
7 The reference  to  Tocqueville  is  probably  as  reliable  an index as  any of  the  broader
cultural frame in which I intended to situate my book. At the time of its inception, myth
criticism was  at  its  zenith,  and provided scholars  with tools  combining insight  with
comprehensiveness. However, the organic links which it predicated between individual
perception and collective representation filtered out most of the detailed evidence of
History, with its baffling array of interlocking factors. It also attenuated one’s sense of the
immediacy of  experience,  insofar  as  it  tended to substitute abstract  patterns for  the
rough‑and‑tumble urgency of individual situations… More precisely, I was helped in my
attempt to throw light on Emerson’s predicament by a chance similitude with my own
past, which was that of a young Frenchman who grew up during Word War II under the
Vichy government, and was immersed for a long time in its stultifying, sanctimonious
atmosphere,  before he could—rather painstakingly—begin to move away from it,  and
learn to measure its devious destructiveness. I was well equipped to respond with keen
sympathy  to  the  Emerson  of  the  late  1840’s  and  early  1850’s,  who  discovered  with
anguished fury that the « castle in the air, » to borrow Thoreau’s phrase, that he had been
so anxious to erect, rested in fact on the quicksands and treacherous marshes of History.
His premature repudiation of social encumbrances, glorified in the experience of the sole
self confronted with the universe, had blinded him to Nature’s deceptiveness. He could
now name « Illusions » the final chapter of The Conduct of Life, just as « Prospects » had
furnished a coda to Nature,  his first book. The hydrostatic paradox was at best only a
beautiful chimera.
8 It seemed to me that the agonizing reappraisal thus forced on Emerson had not elicited
the critical attention that it deserved. If the final chapters of my book were explicitly
conceived to fill in this gap, the earlier ones were meant to chart the meandering course
of a thought which paradoxically suffered from the civilized softness of its environment,
and was prompted to throw off subversive challenges almost exactly in proportion to the
lack of any foreseeable retaliation. There is an irony in the fact that Emerson’s political
philosophy crystallized under the influence of Fichte’s electrifying, warlike Reden an die
deutscheNation, at a time when New England was blissfully exempt from any major social
or national upheaval. And there is a symmetrical irony in Emerson’s outrageous, glaringly
mistaken optimism derived from his unqualified endorsement of the cause of the North
during  the  Civil  War.  No  less  than  political  innocence,  political  alignment  could  be
pregnant with danger.
9 […] All in all, the image of Emerson which this book tries to convey is human, exceedingly
so.  It  incorporates  hesitations,  gropings,  remorses,  errors,  rigidities,  in  a  fascinating
interplay of self and society. But it also testifies to an unshaken faith in man’s ability to
think through his destiny. Much of Emerson’s continuing cultural appeal lies, I would
submit, in this irreducibly complex identity, this peculiar and yet meaningful blend of
soul‑searching  and  pride,  insight  and  purblindness,  transcendence  and  social  guilt,
eventuating in the figure of an impassioned, if fragile, Puritan Prometheus.
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10 Une dernière remarque :  dans un entretien télévisé récent, l’historien Jacques Le Goff
expliquait, à propos de son livre sur Saint Louis, qu’il avait pris peu à peu conscience de la
signification d’une vie saisie dans sa totalité, en‑deçà et au‑delà de ses moments‑phares.
Appliquée à Emerson, l’approche suggérée par Jacques Le Goff pourrait faire émerger une
image plus subtile, moins schématique, et finalement plus accomplie, à l’échelle du siècle
en quelque sorte, que celle du « representative man » auquel les écoles critiques qui se
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